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Abstract
This study provides empirical evidence on income smoothing from the banking 
sector in nine South-Eastern Europe (SEE) countries for the period 2005-2014 by 
applying a number of methodological approaches. First, by using a sample of 321 
banks this paper confirms our first hypothesis that banks in the SEE region use 
loan loss provisions (LLPs) to smooth their incomes. Second, by dividing the loan 
loss provision into its two components (discretionary and non-discretionary,) the 
study provides new evidence on the effects of loan loss provisions components on 
growth in bank lending. The results clearly prove our second hypothesis that the 
components of LLPs do matter on growth in bank lending. Third, this paper 
estimates the use of loan loss provisions for capital management by banks. The 
empirical results do not support the hypothesis of capital management for SEE 
banks. The novelty of this paper, unlike other works, is the inclusion of SEE 
countries.
Key words: loan loss provisioning, South and Eastern European banks, income 
smoothing, capital management hypothesis, discretionary component, non-
discretionary component
JEL classification: G21, M10, M41, M49 
* Received: 25-10-2020; accepted: 04-12-2020
1 Teaching Assistant, University of Prishtina “Hasan Prishtina”, Faculty of Economics, 10000 
Prishtine, The Republic of Kosovo. Scientific affiliation: banking, corporate finance and 
institutional economic. Phone: +383 44 422 122. E-mail: albulena.shala@uni-pr.edu. ORCID 
ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8403-4536.
2 Full Professor, University of Prishtina “Hasan Prishtina”, Faculty of Economics, 10000 Prishtine, 
The Republic of Kosovo. Scientific affiliation: financial economics, banking, institutional 
economics. Phone: +383 44 376 907. E-mail: valentin.toci@uni-pr.edu. ORCID ID: https://
orcid.org/0000-0003-1062-918X. (Corresponding author).
3 Full Professor, University of Prishtina “Hasan Prishtina”, Faculty of Economics, 10000 
Prishtine, The Republic of Kosovo. Scientific affiliation: accounting, managerial accounting and 
cost accounting. Phone: +383 44 313 130. E-mail: skender.ahmeti@uni-pr.edu. 
Albulena Shala, Valentin Toçi, Skender Ahmeti • Income smoothing through loan loss... 
430 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2020 • vol. 38 • no. 2 • 429-452
1. Introduction
Income smoothing in the banking sector is a process in which banks use high 
earnings to create buffers that are used in periods of low earnings. Recent studies 
have examined bank managers’ using of LLPs to smooth their incomes and manage 
regulatory the ratio of capital (such as Lobo and Yang, 2001; Shrieves and Dahl, 
2003; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004a; Ozili and Outa, 2018; Habib et al., 2020). As a 
result, the income smoothing in the banking sector has made earnings less volatile 
over time. If potential perceived performance is projected to be low, managers 
have an opportunity to move current earnings towards the future to keep down the 
possibility of poor future performance, also, managers’ concerns about their job 
security create an incentive to use LLPs for income smoothing. In doing so, it allows 
them to ‘save’ earnings for possible use in the future. Managers are motivated to use 
their discretion over accruals to smooth the volatility of performance. Consequently, 
banks will smooth their incomes by using LLPs when their incomes are high, and 
lowering the LLPs if their incomes are low (Kanagaretnam et al., 2003; Ozili and 
Outa, 2018; Ozil, 2019). 
Another important matter in which the recent studies have focused is whether banks 
use LLPs to manage regulatory capital requirements. The capital management 
hypothesis says that banks use the LLPs to manage with their regulatory capital 
(e.g., Pérez et al., 2008; Leventis et al., 2011; Beccalli and Poli, 2015; Curcio and 
Hasan, 2015). 
The main purpose of this paper is to test the possibility of using LLPs by banks 
in CEE countries. Therefore, this paper will answer three important hypotheses, 
based on the literature review. The first hypothesis of this paper is that LLPs are 
used by banks for income smoothing in SEE countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Romania 
and Slovenia). Since LLPs have a non-discretionary (NDISC) component and 
a discretionary component (DISC), the study separates the discretionary part 
of the provisions so that it can be examined whether bank managers used the 
discretionary component to manage their incomes for the period 2005-2014. So, 
the second hypothesis, is that LLP components have an effect on growth in bank 
lending in SEE countries. The third hypothesis is that LLPs are not used for capital 
management for countries in the sample.
For the following purposes, our study is very important. First, there is no study that 
tested the income smoothing hypothesis for SEE banks, so our study aims to shed 
some light on whether SEE banks used LLPs to smooth their incomes. Second, 
including this region this research will also contribute to the income smoothing 
and capital management literature. Our study contributes to the extant literature 
through empirical findings. First, our findings confirm that banks in SEE countries 
use LLPs to smooth their incomes. Second, by controlling for components of LLP, 
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we contribute to the literature that examines the effects of these components on 
loans growths among banks. The results find that both of them have an effect on 
loan growth. Third, by controlling for capital management hypothesis, our study 
contributes to literature on bank capital regulation.
This topic is of particular importance for banks supervisors and banks’ external 
auditors, as it helps them to understand better if the managers of banks did use 
LLPs for their objectives.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section reviews 
previous literature. Section three describes methodological issues related to 
income smoothing (the analytical methods used to separate LLP discretionary 
and non-discretionary components, a description of the models used by previous 
authors to test income smoothing). Section four data, includes sample selection and 
description of variables in details. The last two sections (five and six) discuss the 
results of the study from the needs for prevention of misuse of LLPs.
2. Literature review
Research on LLPs remains a very important aspect of banking research, for four 
key purposes. First, LLPs is a significant discretionary accrual at the disposal of 
bank directors. Second, LLPs has a strong impact on the margin of bank interest and 
therefore affects average bank earnings. Three, LLPs is related to micro-prudential 
supervision by bank regulators and is related to the informativeness of accounting 
disclosures needed by accounting standard-setters in financial reports (Ozili, 2017).
LLPs are a fairly large big accrual for commercial banks, and therefore, for many 
activities LLPs are used by managers. In recent years, research in the banking sector 
focuses on the using of LLPs for income smoothing and capital management as well 
as the relationship of LLPs to the respective countries’ macroeconomic conditions 
(Majnoni and Cavallo, 2001; Lobo and Yang, 2001; Bikker and Metzemakers, 
2005; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; Fonseca and González, 2008; Packer and Zhu, 
2012; Bonin and Kosak, 2013; Bouvatier et al., 2014; Olszak et al., 2017; Caporale 
et al., 2018; Ozili, 2018).
Income smoothing is a subject that was discussed very early by different authors 
and continues to be explored even today, especially after the recent financial 
crisis. More recently, several empirical studies in commercial banks, particularly 
American banks, have revealed various smoothing practices.
Kanagaretnam et al. (2003) analyses the Fudenberg-Tirole model’s projections 
by evaluating how bank managers smooth their incomes through LLPs. Their 
empirical analysis shows that managers use LLPs to smooth their incomes. Their 
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results suggest that when actual earnings are relatively low (high), but predicted 
relatively high (low) potential unmanaged earnings, managers may release (build) 
reserves. In reality, bank managers are “borrowing” earnings from the future. 
According to Kanagaretnam et al. (2004), bank managers appraise LLPs to 
represent changes in expected future loan losses. Their research underlines that 
managers are using the LLPs to meet more than one target results. Kanagaretnam et 
al. (2004a) findings evidence that US banks use discretionary loan loss provisions 
to reduce earnings fluctuations and to manage their capital. These findings are 
compatible with the income smoothing hypothesis to keep down income volatility. 
Bushman and Williams (2012) study the case of forward-looking LLPs and find 
that banks use their discretion in forward-looking provisioning to smooth their 
incomes. According to Bushman and Williams (2012), loan loss provisioning is a 
primary accounting method that directly affects the stability and cyclicality of bank 
earnings. Using U.S. data, Bushman and Williams (2015) find out that trying of 
bank to postpone provisions on losses in the balance sheet will contribute more 
to systemic risk and the effect is greater during economic downturns. According 
to Bushman and Williams (2015) decreases in transparency will contribute to 
increased consumer confusion regarding to weaken market discipline over risk-
taking behavior. During the global financial crisis, Morris et al. (2016) studied the 
economic determinants and value significance of the LLP of US banks. They find 
that discretionary provisions are used for smoothing and signaling, but smoothing 
happens more often.
There are also many studies for European countries. The income-smoothing 
hypothesis was tested by Norden and Stoian (2014) based on quarterly data from 
85 Dutch banks covering the period from 1998 to 2012. Norden and Stoian (2014) 
note that general provisions are not tax-deductible in the Dutch tax law system 
as in many other EU countries. In addition, Dutch banks’ general LLPs are not 
recognized as Tier Two capital. They find that banks use LLPs, in fact, banks are 
changing LLPs to prevent fluctuations in their assets weighted against risk. Pérez 
et al. (2008) examined data from financial statements for 142 Spanish banks, they 
emphasize that banks must reach minimum regulatory capital standards, which 
means that income smoothing through LLPs may result from accounting practices 
intended to meet those requests. According to Pérez et al. (2008) in many countries’ 
bankers have broad flexibility in deciding the sum of LLPs to accumulate and 
LLPs offer a unique tool for banks to smooth their incomes. They verified the 
income smoothing hypothesis in Spanish banks through general and specific LLPs, 
but they did not find the using of LLPs for capital management. Therefore, the 
authors mention that the introduction of the transparent statistical provision, which 
is separately reported by banks on a line in their income statements, contributes 
to improving the quality of accounting data. Working on a panel of European 
commercial banks, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) figure out that banks use LLPs to 
smooth their incomes in all the different countries that they include.
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Leventis et al. (2011) analyzed the usage of LLPs for income smoothing and capital 
management hypothesis between 91 listed European banks that approve IFRS 
(International Financial Reporting Standards) standards, and figure out evidence 
that LLPs are used by early and late adopters of IFRS to smooth their incomes, 
but this behavior is low after the IFRS. They have also found that, overall, while 
riskier banks participate more in income smoothing using LLPs prior to IFRS 
implementation, these banks’ propensity to engage in identical behavior in the post-
IFRS regime has been significantly lower. They have not found any evidence to 
indicate that LLPs are used for capital management.
Curcio and Hasan (2015) analyzed the Euro and non-Euro Area cases and find 
that banks outside the Euro Area use LLPs as an income-smoothing tool during 
the financial crisis years 2007–2010, but not to manage their capital ratios or to 
transfer private information to the market. They have found no similar evidence for 
credit institutions in the Euro Area. Curcio et al. (2017) also examined the use of 
discretionary LLPs, during the time when Euro Area banks faced a declining credit 
standard and a significant decline in profitability, when banks were subject to a new 
form of stricter supervision, called the 2010 and 2011 European Banking Authority 
(EBA) stress testing exercises. Curcio et al. (2017) find proof for income smoothing 
through LLPs at banks that were subject of EBA. In addition, during the years 
2004–2012, Skała (2015) analyzed 179 commercial banks in 11 Central European 
countries, providing empirical evidence that banks in Central European countries 
use LLPs to smooth their incomes. Skała (2015) stated that LLPs directly have an 
effect on the net profit amount and thereby retain earnings which are a portion of 
bank capital. According to Skała (2015) income smoothing through LLPs is closely 
connected to capital adequacy and in the economic downturn Central European 
banks create additional reserves, leading to higher LLPs. Also, Ozili and Thankom 
(2018) finds that European banks use LLPs to smooth their incomes.
Taktak et al. (2010a) also conducted a regression analysis study, using a data set 
of 278 banks operating in OECD countries. The results indicate that commercial 
banks tend to adhere to real income smoothing more often than to artificial ones by 
selling shares instead of managing provisions on loan losses. According to Taktak et 
al. (2010) artificial smoothing results from manipulating or controlling accounting 
figures, meanwhile real smoothing, results from manipulating or controlling real 
activities. Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) emphasize that banks are setting higher 
levels of reserves aside during good years, for example, as a precaution – provisions 
are increased in good years for use in lean ones. The capital-to-asset ratio (CAP) 
is negatively correlated with provisions, supporting the hypotheses of capital 
management predicting higher provisioning when the capital ratio is relatively low. 
Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) analyzed a sample from 41 countries. They also show 
proof of income smoothing via LLPs. According to Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008), 
bank income smoothing in the form of LLPs varies from one country to another 
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depending on factors such as investor protection, disclosure, regulation, financial 
structure and development, etc.
The results are mixed among Asian studies. Some of them find that Chinese banks 
engaged in income smoothing (Packer and Zhu, 2012; Bonin and Kosak, 2013; Wu 
et al.,2015; Curcio et al., 2017; Ozili, 2018; Vishnani et al., 2019). However, Bryce 
et al. (2015) find that Vietnamese banks did not engage in income smoothing.
Present studies also show that LLPs is related to capital management. According 
to Beatty and Liao (2014) the motivations of banks to use accounting discretion 
to manage regulatory capital ratio can rely on how costly it is to hold extra equity 
capital. Beatty et al. (1995) concluded that while accrual decisions for managers 
are complicated by other capital-raising activities, LLPs are used as capital-
management mechanism. Capital management hypothesis claims that bank 
executives use LLPs to reduce the potential regulatory costs correlated with the 
violation of capital adequacy requirements (Ahmed et al., 1999; Fonseca and 
Gonzales, 2008). The hypothesis of capital management foresee that the capital 
ratio is negatively connected to LLPs because bank managers with low capital ratios 
can raise them by charging more LLPs, to keep down regulatory costs required by 
regulations on capital adequacy ratios (Lobo and Yang, 2001). Ahmed et al. (1999) 
claim that, because bank regulators expect banks to retain minimum regulatory 
capital for the risk they face, bank managers have some ability to manipulate the 
amount of LLPs so that they can fulfill minimum regulatory capital standards, if 
LLPs are included in the measurement of minimum regulatory capital ratios. 
According to Kanagaretnam et al. (2004), while bank managers with low regulatory 
capital have stimulations to increase LLPs because bank regulators require banks to 
keep minimum regulatory capital ratios (CAP). They suggest that the coefficient on 
CAP should be negative. Pérez et al. (2008) also emphasis that banks can use LLPs 
to modify retained earnings, thereby managing their regulatory capital, in order to 
meet their targets for regulatory capital. However, their results show that, contrary 
to the capital management hypothesis predictions, the coefficient of CAP is positive 
and statistically significant. Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) argue that the CAP 
ratio is negatively correlated with provisions, supporting the hypotheses of capital 
management predicting higher provisioning when the capital ratio is relatively 
small. According to Taktak et al. (2010) a negative sign of the CAP indicates that 
the lower the capital ratio, the higher the LLP will be. According to the authors, this 
finding supports the claim that well-capitalized banks enter less risky activities. 
Olszak (2012) analyses quarterly data for Poland from 1998 through 2009. There 
is no statistically significant relation between LLPs and CAP ratio, so the analysis 
indicates the rejection of the hypothesis of capital management. According to 
Olszak (2012) this could be a result of Polish commercial banks’ very favorable 
capital positioning. Caporale et al. (2018) examined data from a panel of 400 Italian 
banks to investigate the determinants of LLP between 2001 and 2015. Caporale et 
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al. (2018) find proof that the CAP ratio and the LLPs had a negative relationship. 
According to Taktak et al. (2010) a negative sign of CAP indicates that the lower 
the capital ratio, the higher the LLPs will be. According to the authors, this finding 
supports the claim that well-capitalized banks enter less risky activities. But, Aristei 
and Gallo (2019) do not support the hypothesis of income smoothing and capital 
management and indicate that LLPs by Italian banks are mainly motivated by non-
discretionary factors relevant to expected credit risk during the crisis time. Also, 
Ozil, (2017) for a bank sample of selected Western European banking institutions 
find that banks use LLPs for income smoothing and capital management. 
Abu-Serdaneh (2018) analysis all listed Jordanian banks and covers the 2005-2014 
period. The findings show that there is no definitive evidence to support the use 
of provisions by Jordanian banks to smooth their incomes, manage capital ratios 
or engage in pro-cyclical behavior. Soedarmono et al. (2017) investigates whether 
LLPs in Islamic banks is procyclical from a study of Islamic banks worldwide from 
1997 to 2012. A closer analysis further documents that Islamic banks also use LLPs 
for capital management, where reserves and provisions for loan losses are inflated 
as bank capitalization declines.
3. Methodology
There are two ways to test income smoothing. First, the first one, testing the relation 
between the variables of LLPs with earnings before taxes and provisions (EBTPs) 
and the second way, by dividing the LLPs into its two components and then 
continuing to test the relationship between the discretionary part (DISC)and the 
EBTPs. According to Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), two components of LLPs are 
mentioned in the literature. The first one, named the non-discretionary component 
(NDISC), is done in a bank’s loan portfolio to cover expected future credit losses. 
The second part, named the discretionary component (DISC), is attributed to the 
usage of LLPs for goals of management. Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) in their 
equation included EBTPs to test income smoothing and CAP ratio to test the 
capital management hypothesis. The DISC component according to Bouvatier and 
Lepetit (2012), is primarily related to non-performing loans (NPLs). Also, Wahlen 
(1994) and Kanagaretnam et al. (2004) splits LLPs into two components: the non-
discretionary and the discretionary. The authors note that information about non-
discretionary provision for loan losses may allow investors to assess the discrete 
components of the LLPs. 
Consistent with earlier studies, a two-stage method is adopted for testing of income 
smoothing through the discretionary component of LLPs (Kanagaretnam, et al., 
2004; Kwak et al., 2009; Taktak et al., 2010; Leventis et al., 2011; Bouvatier et al., 
2014; Othman and Mersni, 2014; Shawtari et al., 2015; Bryce et al., 2015; Aristei 
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and Gallo, 2019). The non-discretionary component of LLP is estimated in the 
first stage using the model in equation (1), so that the discretionary component is 
isolated from the total of LLPs. In keeping with earlier studies, following variables 
are used to estimate the non-discretionary component of LLPs:
LLPit = β0 + β1ΔNPLit + β2Lit + β3CAP + β4EBTP + β5NPLit + 
 + β6GDPit + εit (1)
where:
LLPs – Loan loss provisions over total bank assets for bank i at time t.
∆ NPL – The change in non-performing loans deflated by beginning total loan.
LOANS/TA – Growth rate of net loans to total assets.
EBPT – Ratio of earnings before taxes and LLPs divided by total asset.
NPL – Ratio of non-performing loans divided by total loans.
GDP – Real growth of GDP.
According to Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008 & 2012), Aristei and Gallo (2019) in 
non-discretionary component of LLPs are considered variables which statistically 
significant. If a variable is not significant or has the opposite sign from expected, 
the variable associated with this coefficient is dropped (Bouvatier and Lepetit, 
2012). Whereas the past equation estimates the non-discretionary portion of LLP, in 
equation (2) the discretionary component is estimated as residual. Also, following 
Jin et al. (2018) the residuals of Equations (1) are computed as DISC:
DISCit = LLPit – β̂1NDISCit  (2)
where:
LLPs – Loan loss provisions over total bank assets for bank i at time t.
DISC – Discretionary portion of LLP.
NDISC – The non-discretionary portion of LLP.
According to Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012), the advantages of this definition 
are double, it tends to be applied for each dataset, paying little attention to the 
importance of variables catching the discretionary behavior. These discretionary 
and non-discretionary components are used to test the impact of provisioning 
behaviors on bank loans fluctuations. According to Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) 
the variable NDISC it includes all the variables which may explain the non-
discretionary component. 
In the second stage, the relationship between the discretionary component and other 
variables is being tested. The independent variables in equation (3) hereinafter 
presents variables hypothesized to impact the discretionary component. Following 
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many other authors (Kanagaretna et al., 2004 & 2004a; Kwak et al., 2009; 
Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2012; Norden and Stoian, 2014; Shawtari et al., 2015) in this 
way, directly was tested the relationship between EBTPs and DISC:
DISCit = β0 + β1ΔNPLit + β2Lit + β3CAP + β4EBTP + β5NPLit + 
 + β6GDPit + + β7LDit + β8Sizeit + εit  (3)
where:
DISC – Discretionary portion of LLP.
∆ NPL – The change in non-performing loans deflated by beginning total loan.
LOANS/TA – Growth rate of net loans to total assets.
CAP – Capital to total assets.
EBPT – Ratio of earnings before taxes and LLPs divided by total asset.
NPL – Ratio of non-performing loans divided by total loans.
GDP – Real growth of GDP.
LD – Total loans to total deposits.
Size – Logarithm of total assets.
If the coefficient of EBTPs is positive and significant with discretionary component, 
the result shows that banks have used LLPs for income smoothing. 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) show that provisions relating to non-discretionary 
loan loss exacerbate a pro-cyclical effect because higher non-discretionary 
provisions keep down growth in bank loans. By comparison, DISC, particularly 
those associated to income smoothing behavior, has no significant effect on the 
growth of bank loans. Within various banking systems, though, the provisioning 
activities and their subsequent impact on lending growth will vary considerably. 
Their findings indicate that the non-discretionary portion of LLP has a negative and 
significant impact on growth in bank lending in all the countries that they listed, 
with larger frequency for developing countries excluding Japan.
Based on the models used in the Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012) studies, in equation 4 
it was tested for the effects of the non-discretionary and discretionary components 
on lending growth:
Lit = α + β1 +  β2 NDISCit + β3 DISCit + β3 Dit + β4 Eit + β5 SIZEit–1 + εit (4)
where:
L – Growth rate of net loans to total assets.
DISC – Discretionary portion of LLP.
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NDISC – The non-discretionary portion of LLP.
D – Growth rate of deposits.
E – Capital to total assets.
EBPT – Ratio of earnings before taxes and LLPs divided by total asset.
SIZE – Logarithm of total assets.
In this paper countries from South and East Europe are involved. The database 
contains information of active commercial banks that reported financial statements 
to Bankscope database for the period 2005-2014 in 9 countries (Albania, Bulgaria, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, 
Romania and Slovenia). Table 1 shows the number of banks involved for each 
country.
Table 1: Number of banks included in the sample
Country Symbol Number of banks
Albania AL 20










In next section we will explain the variables that are included in models.
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4. Empirical data and analysis
Models include several control variables. Definitions of variables are presented in 
Table 2.
Table 2: Summary of the variables
Variable Predicted sign Definition
LLPs +/- Loan loss provisions over total bank assets for bank iat time t
∆ NPL +/- The change in non-performing loans deflated by beginning total loan.
L +/- Growth rate of net loans to total assets.
E +/- Capital adequacy ratio.
D +/- Growth rate of deposits.
EBPT + Ratio of earnings before taxes and LLPs divided by total asset.
GDP - Real growth of GDP
CAP - Capital to total assets
NPL +/- Ratio of non-performing loans divided by total loans
LOANS/TA +/- Total loans divided by total assets
SIZE +/- Logarithm of total assets
LD +/- Total loans to total deposits
NDISC - The non-discretionary portion of LLP.
DISC - Discretionary portion of LLP.
Note: Bank-level data are from the Bankscope database. GDP growth, inflation and unemployment 
data are from the World Bank development indicators.
Source: Authors’
The most important variable in this research is EBTPit, as it measures income 
smoothing. For the income smoothing hypothesis, as suggested by many authors 
(Wahlen, 1994; Collins et al., 1995; Beatty et al., 1995; Ahmed et al., 1999; Jin et 
al., 2018) should be a positive relationship between EBTPs and LLPs. Specifically, 
banks can use LLPs according to the income-smoothing hypothesis to smooth their 
incomes by overstating (understating) LLPs when incomes are expected to be high/
low (Aristei and Gallo, 2019).
A growing share of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the loan portfolio of banks 
signifies greater risks affecting both the liquidity and profitability of banks. Moreover, 
it represents a weakening balance sheet of banks (Ghosh, 2015). According to 
Škarica (2014) the high levels of NPLs are becoming a growing concern, provided 
the experiences from previous financial crises indicate that a lasting recovery needs 
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a ‟clean-up” in the financial sector. According to previous literature, NPLs may be 
introduced as a bad output (or, in terms of the profit function, an expense that reduces 
total profits) into the production function of the bank (García-Alcober et al., 2019). 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012) used the ratio of NPLs divided by total assets at the 
end of the year t (NPLit) and the first difference of NPLit (TNPLit = NPLit – NPLit–1) 
as explanatory variables. Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) argue that NPLs are a good 
indicator of the expected loss identified by banks for their loan portfolio. 
Also, the ratio of NPLs to gross loans at the end of the year t (NPLit) is a good 
evidence of the risk of non-payment on banks’ loans (Kim and Kross, 1998; Lobo 
and Yang, 2001; Bouvatier and Lepetit 2008; Skała, 2015).
Empirical studies that test the capital management hypothesis focus on the negative 
relationship between the coefficients of LLP and CAP ratio (Collins et al., 1995; 
Kim and Kross, 1998; Ahmed et al., 1999; Lobo and Yang, 2001; Anandarajan et 
al., 2007; Leventis et al., 2011; Curcio and Hasan, 2015; Simper et al., 2019).
Loan to deposit ratio (LDit) has been used as proxy for external financing in 
studies. Following Kanagaretnam et al. (2003 & 2004a) the ratio of total loans 
to total deposits is used as a measure of banks' need for external financing. If the 
loan portfolio of a bank is larger than its total deposits, it would need to borrow 
to finance its lending portfolio. Banks are typically financed by customer deposits, 
but they require sufficient equity resources to meet bank regulatory capital ratios. 
Many researchers (such as Kwak et al., 2009; Shawtari et al., 2015) used the LDit 
as an indicator for external financing of the banking sector. According to Shawatari 
et al. (2015) if the ratio is high, the bank needs external funding, and thus there is 
a tendency for the banks to record low discretionary LLPs to show low figure out 
credit risks and higher reported profits to draw more deposits from the borrowers 
and give the depositors assurance to allocate their funds to the banks. A lower level 
of the ratio of LDit represents a lower dependence on wholesale funding which 
means that the bank is less market constrained in its asset growth (Cucinelli, 2015). 
Another control variable, which measures the size of the bank, is the natural 
logarithm of total assets (Size). Based on many studies (such as Anandarajan et al., 
2007; Pérez et al., 2008; Leventis et al., 2011) larger banks might have higher levels 
of activity than small banks, so they have higher LLPs because they are required 
to take greater activity and risk into account. From the other hand, considering 
opportunities for portfolio diversification, becoming more likely to be exploited in a 
larger credit portfolio, the relation between bank size and the usage of LLPs may be 
predicted to be negative. Leventis et al. (2011) also suggest that relatively smaller 
banks often hold higher LLPs ratio. This can be due to less effective diversification 
of credit risk policies. Meanwhile, according to Tran et al. (2019) large banks tend 
to have more stable activities and better risk diversification capacity. Large banks 
are expected to report smaller amounts of DISC, while small banks are more likely 
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to have deficiencies in internal control and are more likely to correct previously 
reported earnings. In addition, larger banks may be subject to stricter regulatory 
scrutiny and monitoring.
Variable (Lit) is the ratio of total loans divided by total assets and represents a 
measure for the risk profile of the bank (Taktak et al., 2010). Bouvatier and Lepetit 
(2008) also include the risk of default for the overall credit portfolio, calculated by 
the ratio of net loans divided by total assets (Lit). 
Moreover, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008 & 2012), Soedarmono et al. (2012) study 
the effect of discretionary vs. non-discretionary LLPs on bank lending. Both find 
that non-discretionary provisions amplify credit fluctuations. Therefore, both 
components of LLPs are relevant to determine growth in lending. 
GDP is the rate of growth of gross domestic product in year t. It is aims to catch the 
effect of macroeconomic conditions on LLPs (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker 
and Metzemakers, 2005; Taktak et al., 2010; Aristei and Gallo, 2019). Coherent 
with recent methodological literature (Ghosh, 2007; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; 
Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008; Leventis et al., 2011; Bushman and Williams, 2012; 
Aristei and Gallo, 2019) a significant and negative coefficient of the growth rate of 
GDP confirms provide evidence on the strong pro-cyclical pattern of LLPs.
We implemented a panel data approach using a model of fixed effects to test 
three hypotheses, that for the presence of income smoothing, capital management 
and the effect of components of LLPs on bank lending growth, in which we 
included variables usually applied in other studies. To examine the effect of these 
components of LLPs on lending behavior, first, the dependent variable (LLPs/TA) 
was analyzed with the independent variables included in the first equation.
A positive and significant result between EBTPs and LLPs would be compatible 
with the income smoothing hypothesis, implying that in periods of strong 
profitability banks raise their provisioning, whilst declines in profits contribute to 
the use of the earlier generated loan loss reserve buffers. It is important to note that 
EBTPs has a positive relationship but insignificant with LLPs. The positive sign 
of the coefficient of the EBTPs/ TA variable is consistent with the results of other 
authors (such as Bikker and Metzemakers 2005; Pérez et al., 2008; Fonseca and 
Gonzales 2008; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008 & 2012; Taktak et al., 2010). This is 
also the first way to test income smoothing directly through the positive coefficient 
of EBTPs/TA.
In addition, banks can use LLPs for capital management. The total capital ratio 
(CAP/TA) is used to capture this behavior for SEE banks. Findings show that 
the capital ratio coefficient is positive and statistically significant, contrary to 
the predictions of the capital management hypothesis. This confirms our third 
hypothesis that banks in SEE countries did not use the LLPs to manage their 
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capital. Therefore, is no statistical evidence to indicate that banks employ capital 
management through LLPs. This means that banks in SEE were well capitalized 
and have no need to use LLPs to manage their capital. Our findings, however, 
are similar to that reported by Fonseca and Gonzalez, (2008), Pérez et al. (2008), 
etc. According to Pérez et al. (2008) this indicates that the absence of capital 
management implies that banks adopt the strategy of covering expected losses with 
provisions and unexpected losses with capital.
The coefficient of variable NPL_TA is positive and significant (Tab. 3). According 
to Kanagaretnam et al. (2004) an increase in NPLs is likely to result in an increase 
in the LLPs. This is to say, with a higher level of beginning NPLs, banks should 
have to make higher LLPs. The risk of default (LOANS/TA) for the overall credit 
portfolio was also included in model following Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), 
measured by the ratio of loans divided by total assets.
The ratio of loans to total asset is negative and significant (Tab. 3). After controlling 
for the rest of the variables, the business cycle does not affect bank’s LLPs. Also, 
the variable of NPL_change is not statistically significant (Tab. 3). GDP growth is 
negative but is not statistically significant.
Table 3: The decomposition of loan loss provisions (Model 1)
LLPs/TA Coefficient (t-value) P > |t|
EBTPs/TA 1.783 1.17 0.242
CAP/TA 0.046** 2.25 0.026
NPL/TA 11.961*** 7.10 0.000
LOANS/TA -0.029** -2.58 0.010
GDPgr -0.020 -0.95 0.341
NPL_change -0.015 -0.23 0.819
_cons -0.085 -0.07 0.945
Nr. of observations = 336 
Notes: Significant at: *10, * *5 and * * *1 percent levels. The results are from Eq. (1)
Variable definitions: LLPs/TA: loan loss provisions/total assets, CAP/TA: equity/total assets, 
NPL/TA: non-performing loans/gross loan, NPL_change: change in non-performing loans, 
EBTPs/TA: current earnings before tax and provisions/total assets, GDP growth rate.
Source: Author’s calculations
The calculation of DISC and NDISC component of LLP is also estimated at equation 
(1). In NDISC component of provisions will include all those variables that are 
significant with the dependent variable (LLPs/TA) in equation (1). There are three 
significant variables: loans to total assets, capital to total assets and non-performing 
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loans to total assets. LLP’s discretionary portion is the difference between LLPs and 
the non-discretionary portion. Then was tested for the presence of income smoothing 
by taking the DISC component of LLPs as a dependent variable (Tab. 4).
Table 4: Income smoothing in SEE countries (Model 3)
DISC  Coefficient (t-value) P > |t|
EBTPs_TA  3.124**  2.01 0.045 
CAPITAL/TA  -0.976*** -43.21 0.000 
LOANS/TA -1.032*** -79.63 0.000 
NPL_TA 11.517***  6.67 0.000
TA_log -1.238***  -3.25 0.001 
GDPgr  -0.023  -1.09 0.276 
NPL_change  0.031  0.45 0.656 
LOANS/DEPOSIT  -0.002  -0.63 0.528 
_cons 16.207***  3.13 0.002 
Nr. of observations = 336
Notes: Significant at: *10, * *5 and * * *1 percent levels. The results are from Eq. (3)
Source: Author’s calculations
With regard to the discretionary behavior, the findings are consistent with the 
assumption that banks use LLPs to smooth their incomes. Indeed, the coefficient of 
EBTPs is significant and positive (Tab. 4). The results indicate that banks in SEE 
countries have made income smoothing through LLPs, more precisely with the 
DISCs component of LLPs, thus confirming our first hypothesis. That means LLPs 
are deliberately understated when earnings are expected to be low to reduce adverse 
effects of other earnings factors. From the other side, banks choose discretionary 
income-reducing accruals when the earnings are unusually high. Thus, under the 
behavior of income smoothing; banks choose LLPs to minimize the variance in 
reported earnings. This means that LLPs rise during a period of growth and decline 
during a period of contraction. With respect to discretionary behavior, results are 
consistent with the existing literature (Kanagaretnam et al., 2003; Laeven and 
Majnoni, 2003; Anandarajan et al., 2007; Fonseca and Gonzales, 2008; Kwak, et 
al., 2009; Leventis et al., 2011; Shawtari et al., 2015) as find that banks are using 
the discretionary component of LLP to smooth their incomes. This is the main 
question in this study. 
The second hypothesis of this paper is to investigate the effect of the DISC (income 
smoothing) and the NDISC on growth in bank lending. The results show that 
both variables are negative and statistically significant. The finding is in line with 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008 & 2012).
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Table 5: The effect of discretionary vs. non-discretionary LLPs on bank lending 
(Model 4)
LOANSgr  Coefficient  (t-value)  P > |t|
NDISC -4.054***  -5.43  0.000 
DISC -4.297*** -5.89 0.000
DEPOSITSgr 0.394*** 5.52 0.000
TA_log -10.293** -2.13 0.035
CAPITAL/TA -0.441 -1.31 0.192
_cons 139.883** 2.02 0.045
Nr. of observations = 230 
Notes: Significant at: *10, * *5 and * * *1 percent levels. The results are from Eq. (4b)
Source: Author’s calculations
The coefficient of size is very important to highlight (Tab. 5). The estimation test 
shows the sign of variable of size is negative. This means that the discretionary 
component less emphatic at large banks. The results are similar with Cornett 
et al. (2009) and Shawtari et al. (2015) suggesting that smaller banks were more 
interested in the discretionary component. According to Cornett et al. (2009) larger 
banks are the ones most likely to be monitored by industry analysts. Likewise, 
whilst regulators are charged with maintaining the stability and soundness of the 
financial system as a whole, they at least appear to control the largest institutions 
more closely.
The coefficient associated with the growth rate of deposits is also significant and 
positive in all regressions. Shawtari et al. (2015) indicated that increased external 
financing requirements would inspire bankers to smooth their incomes. In order to 
draw more funds, managers are more encouraged to indulge in discretionary LLPs 
to smooth income and reduce instability. This confirms our second hypothesis 
which states that LLPs components have an effect on growth in bank lending in 
SEE countries.
5. Results and discussion
The results in the above section demonstrate the verification of three hypotheses. 
Firstly, the statistically significant coefficient of EBTP with DISC, indicates that 
banks in SEE countries use LLPs to smooth their incomes. Secondly, the positive 
coefficient of CAP ratio, explains that banks did not use the LLPs for capital 
management. Thirdly, the results clearly show that the components of LLPs do 
matter on growth in bank lending.
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Following the implementation of the legislation (IFRS and Basel II & III) we 
would expect a decrease in the weight of the discretionary part of those provisions 
and, at the same time, an improvement in the portion of the provisions determined 
by credit risk considerations. However, providing a comprehensive collection of 
rules for LLPs does not preclude managers from decreasing volatility in earnings. 
The discussion on the usage of principles vs. comprehensive rules has drawn the 
attention of both accounting experts and setters of criteria (Pérez et al., 2008). The 
use of principles allows greater authority to managers, but this practice encourages 
authorities to ask for more comprehensive disclosure. Our paper indicates, though, 
that regulators ought to engage with accountants in an open discussion. It also 
reinforces the need for disclosure standards that increase bank transparency and 
control of the actions and incentives of bank managers by investors.
According to the results, banks in SEE countries did not use the LLPs for capital 
management. This shows that banks are well capitalized, but capital management 
motivations, do exist and may be a strong incentive for banks facing increased costs 
for violating capital requirements (Anandarajan et al., 2003).
We further jointly consider, in specification (4) the effect of the non-discretionary 
component and the total discretionary component of LLP on growth in lending. 
Both of them are negative and significant that is mean they are relevant to determine 
growth in lending (Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008).
The evidence of these results for SEE countries should recommend increasing 
banking supervision by regulatory authorities and a higher quality of external audit.
Our analysis contributes to a growing body of literature in many ways: 1) prior 
studies focus on the level of a single country, reducing the generalization of 
findings. We use a specific dataset of 336 observations from 9 European countries; 
2) this is the first study to test whether and how LLPs are being used in SEE 
countries for income smoothing and capital management.
6. Conclusion
There have been widely different reported management behavior characteristics in 
the banking loan loss provisioning literature, such as: income smoothing, capital 
management, etc. From the point of view of the banking regulators, LLPs should 
only be used to offset potential losses, but studies have also shown that LLPs 
are mainly used as an instrument for banks’ capital management and income 
smoothing.
Our first hypothesis was to test whether bank managers use LLPs for income 
smoothing. Furthermore, the second hypothesis was to examine whether provisioning 
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practice amplifies growth in bank lending. In the absence of empirical literature on 
this topic in SEE countries, for a sample of banks with unbalanced data during the 
period 2005-2014, this study conducted research on income smoothing through 
LLPs. Income smoothing in regression model was verified through the relation 
between EBTP and LLPs and the relation between DISC component of the LLPs with 
EBTPs coefficient. Therefore, after separating the LLPs into the two components, the 
income smoothing was tested through the DISC component of the LLPs, the EBTPs 
coefficient has a positive sign and significant in favor of income smoothing. Also, 
results show that the DISC and NDISC components have a negative and significant 
effect on bank lending; therefore, both components are relevant to explain credit 
fluctuations. This common characteristic allows us to ensure that banking regulators 
could consider the beneficial aspects of a dynamic provisioning system. Our third 
hypothesis was to test the use of LLPs for capital management. Results also show that 
banks in SEE countries didn’t use LLPs for capital management.
To the best information, this study represents the first effort of conducting research 
on income smoothing and effects of LLPs on growth on bank lending in SEE 
countries. The empirical evidence for income smoothing in SEE banks lay out here 
has substantial policy implications for national regulators, auditors, and investors, and 
the public at large. Despite the considerable effort exerted in conducting the study in 
order to ensure that the objectives of the study were met and research questions were 
answered, one of the limitations of the study is the small sample size. This study for 
the regulators can be very helpful, warning them to make effective policy restricting 
the intensive use of discretion over LLPs to manage their incomes. In addition, 
when reviewing, auditing, and expressing their opinion on financial statements, an 
auditor can pay more attention to the LLPs estimation policy. Future research could 
investigate other credit risk factors that influence the level of discretionary provisions 
among SEE banks. Also, future research could investigate whether discretionary 
provisions are influenced by the risk culture of banks SEE. Future studies should also 
include periods after 2014 in order to investigate the impact of IFRS 9 on the decrease 
or increase of the use of LLPs for income smoothing in SEE countries.
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Podešavanje prihoda kroz rezervacije za gubitke po kreditima u bankama 
Južne i Istočne Europe
Albulena Shala1, Valentin Toçi2, Skender Ahmeti3
Sažetak
Ovo istraživanje primjenom brojnih metodoloških pristupa pruža empirijske 
dokaze o izravnavanju prihoda u bankarskom sektoru u devet zemalja jugoistočne 
Europe (JIE) za razdoblje 2005.-2014. Prvo, korištenjem uzorka od 321 banke, 
ovaj rad potvrđuje našu prvu hipotezu da banke u regiji Jugoistočne Europe 
koriste rezervacije za gubitke po kreditima (LLP) kako bi izravnale svoje prihode. 
Drugo, dijeljenjem rezerviranja za kreditne gubitke na njegove dvije komponente 
(diskrecijsku i ne-diskrecijsku), ovo istraživanje pruža nove dokaze o učincima 
komponenata rezervacija za kreditne gubitke na rast bankarskog kreditiranja. 
Rezultati jasno potvrđuju našu drugu hipotezu da su komponente LLP-a bitne za 
rast bankarskog kreditiranja. Treće, ovaj rad procjenjuje upotrebu banaka za 
rezerviranje gubitaka po kreditima za upravljanje kapitalom. Empirijski rezultati 
ne podupiru hipotezu o upravljanju kapitalom za banke u jugoistočnoj Europi. Za 
razliku od ostalih istraživanja, novost u ovome radu je uključivanje zemalja 
jugoistočne Europe..
Ključne riječi: rezervacije za gubitke po kreditima, banke Južne i Istočne Europe, 
izravnanje prihoda, hipoteza o upravljanju kapitalom, diskrecijska komponenta, 
ne-diskrecijska komponenta.
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